Belief and truth in hypothesised behaviours
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Publication:274416
DOI10.1016/j.artint.2016.02.004zbMath1352.68259arXiv1507.07688OpenAlexW938188971WikidataQ57535016 ScholiaQ57535016MaRDI QIDQ274416
Stefano V. Albrecht, Jacob W. Crandall, Subramanian Ramamoorthy
Publication date: 22 April 2016
Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1507.07688
Applications of game theory (91A80) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Agent technology and artificial intelligence (68T42)
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