scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078991

zbMATH Open0050.14303MaRDI QIDQ5817864FDOQ5817864

Authors: Harold W. Kuhn 

Publication date: 1953

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zbMATH Keywords

game theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18)

Cited In (only showing first 100 items - show all)

• Learning in Games
• Equilibrium existence for large perfect information games
• A pursuit and evasion problem with measurement uncertainty
• A note on the relationship between graphs and information protocols
• Ambiguity attitudes and self-confirming equilibrium in sequential games
• Repeated games with complete information
• On values of repeated games with signals
• Logic and Game Theory
• A note on the one-deviation property in extensive form games
• On non-existence of pure strategy Markov perfect equilibrium
• Memory and perfect recall in extensive games
• Repeated games with incomplete information
• On the interpretation of decision problems with imperfect recall
• On Nash equilibria and improvement cycles in pure positional strategies for chess-like and backgammon-like \(n\)-person games
• A relation between perfect equilibria in extensive form games and proper equilibria in normal form games
• An epistemic characterization of MACA
• Belief and truth in hypothesised behaviours
• Nash-solvable two-person symmetric cycle game forms
• Reputation versus social learning
• Long persuasion games
• On acyclicity of games with cycles
• Strength of preference in graph models for multiple-decision-maker conflicts
• The structure of non-zero-sum stochastic games
• On undiscounted semi-Markov decision processes with absorbing states
• The power of paradox: some recent developments in interactive epistemology
• Acyclic Preferences and Existence of Sequential Nash Equilibria: A Formal and Constructive Equivalence
• Trees and extensive forms
• The chain store paradox
• Markov equilibria in discounted stochastic games
• A new lower bound for the list update problem in the partial cost model
• Dynamic consistency and imperfect recall
• A simple model of imperfect competition where 4 are few and 6 are many
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
• Dynamic psychological games
• On rationalizability in extensive games
• Fall back equilibrium
• Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games
• Value function of differential games without Isaacs conditions. An approach with nonanticipative mixed strategies
• Acceptable and predominant correlated equilibria
• Strategically supported cooperation in dynamic games with coalition structures
• Differential games, dynamic optimization, and generalized control theory
• Payoff information and self-confirming equilibrium
• Essential collections for equilibrium concepts
• Learning in extensive-form games. I: Self-confirming equilibria
• Blackwell optimality in Markov decision processes with partial observation.
• The existence of equilibria in certain games, separation for families of convex functions and a theorem of Borsuk-Ulam type
• Large extensive form games
• Chess-like games may have no uniform Nash equilibria even in mixed strategies
• Information structures and decentralizability of equilibria
• ``Big Match with lack of information on one side. I
• Inductive game theory: a basic scenario
• Online concealed correlation and bounded rationality
• Competitive analysis of randomized paging algorithms
• Mutually acceptable courses of action
• A note on Kuhn's theorem with ambiguity averse players
• Partial memories, inductively derived views, and their interactions with behavior
• Take-and-guess games
• On the equivalence between (quasi-)perfect and sequential equilibria
• Solving for Best Responses and Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games with Reinforcement Learning Methods
• The possibility of Bayesian learning in repeated games
• Algorithmic rationality: game theory with costly computation
• Analysis of information feedback and selfconfirming equilibrium
• Probabilistic reliability and privacy of communication using multicast in general neighbor networks
• Kuhn's theorem for extensive form Ellsberg games
• Spaces of measurable transformations
• Reputation and imperfect information
• Equilibria problems on games: complexity versus succinctness
• Subjective Equilibria Under Beliefs of Exogenous Uncertainty for Dynamic Games
• Reasoning about causality in games
• Games of incomplete information and myopic equilibria
• Optimal strategies in repeated games with incomplete information
• Randomization and simplification in dynamic decision-making.
• Strategic games beyond expected utility
• On the stability of evolutionary dynamics in games with incomplete information
• Characterizing existence of equilibrium for large extensive form games: a necessity result
• A folk theorem for repeated games played on a network
• Lexicographic preferences representable by real-branching trees with countable height: a dichotomy result.
• Independence on relative probability spaces and consistent assessments in game trees
• Characterization of consistent assessments in extensive form games
• Beyond Normal Form Invariance: First Mover Advantage in Two-Stage Games with or without Predictable Cheap Talk
• Multistage games
• Information patterns and Nash equilibria in extensive games: I
• Mixed extensions of decision problems under uncertainty
• Does backwards induction imply subgame perfection?
• Tournament-stable equilibria
• A note on equalization in extensive form games
• Equivalences among five game specifications, including a new specification whose nodes are sets of past choices
• Adaptive competitive decision in repeated play of a matrix game with uncertain entries
• Simple uncoupled no-regret learning dynamics for extensive-form correlated equilibrium
• The chain-store paradox revisited
• Randomizing when time is not well-ordered
• Subgame monotonicity in extensive form evolutionary games
• A finite-state, finite-memory minimum principle
• Equilibria of Games in Networks for Local Tasks
• From memories to inductively derived views: a constructive approach
• Strong forward induction
• Pure Nash Equilibria in Resource Graph Games
• The optimal capture time of the one-cop-moves game
• Approximating maxmin strategies in imperfect recall games using A-loss recall property

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