Existence and efficiency of a stationary subgame-perfect equilibrium in coalitional bargaining models with nonsuperadditive payoffs

DOI10.1007/s00199-008-0334-zzbMath1156.91310MaRDI QIDQ1006584

Toshiji Miyakawa

Publication date: 25 March 2009

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0334-z

zbMATH Keywords

delay; coalitional bargaining; existence of stationary subgame-perfect equilibrium; nonsuperadditive game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

Related Items

Bargaining delay under partial breakdowns and externalities, Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining

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