Existence and efficiency of a stationary subgame-perfect equilibrium in coalitional bargaining models with nonsuperadditive payoffs
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Publication:1006584
DOI10.1007/s00199-008-0334-zzbMath1156.91310MaRDI QIDQ1006584
Publication date: 25 March 2009
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0334-z
delay; coalitional bargaining; existence of stationary subgame-perfect equilibrium; nonsuperadditive game
91A10: Noncooperative games
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
Related Items
Bargaining delay under partial breakdowns and externalities, Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining
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