Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2434224
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2013.09.007zbMath1284.91031MaRDI QIDQ2434224
Hülya Eraslan, Andrew McLennan
Publication date: 5 February 2014
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/49901
coalitions; fixed points; fixed point index; TU games; simple games; legislative bargaining; noncooperative bargaining; multilateral bargaining
91A12: Cooperative games
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
91B32: Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.)
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