The maximal generic number of pure Nash equilibria

DOI10.1006/JETH.1996.2213zbMATH Open0883.90131OpenAlexW2036401256MaRDI QIDQ1363372FDOQ1363372

Andrew McLennan

Publication date: 23 March 1998

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://purl.umn.edu/55720

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zbMATH Keywords

pure strategy Nash equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Cites Work

• The maximal number of regular totally mixed Nash equilibria
• A theorem on the number of Nash equilibria in a bimatrix game
• A Bound on the Proportion of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Generic Games

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• Asymptotic expected number of Nash equilibria of two-player normal form games
• Supermajority politics: equilibrium range, policy diversity, utilitarian welfare, and political compromise
• Golden games
• Generic \(4\times 4\) two person games have at most 15 Nash equilibria
• The number of pure Nash equilibria in a random game with nondecreasing best responses
• Unmixing the mixed volume computation
• Random extensive form games
• A sandwich theorem for generic \(n \times n\) two person games
• On the testable implications of collective choice theories
• A globally convergent algorithm to compute all Nash equilibria for \(n\)-person games
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining

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