Limiting distributions of the number of pure strategy Nash equilibria in \(n\)-person games

From MaRDI portal
Publication:2277378

DOI10.1007/BF01755478zbMath0725.90105OpenAlexW2060842745MaRDI QIDQ2277378

I. Y. Powers

Publication date: 1990

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01755478




Related Items (23)

Individually rational pure strategies in large gamesThe frequency of convergent games under best-response dynamicsRandom extensive form gamesWhen ``better is better than ``bestBest-response dynamics, playing sequences, and convergence to equilibrium in random gamesThe complexity of game isomorphismThe number of pure Nash equilibria in a random game with nondecreasing best responsesGolden gamesProbabilities of pure Nash equilibria in matrix games when the payoff entries of one player are randomly selectedAsymptotic expected number of Nash equilibria of two-player normal form gamesPure strategy Nash equilibria and the probabilistic prospects of Stackelberg playersConnectivity and equilibrium in random gamesOn the probability of existence of pure equilibria in matrix gamesThe number of pure strategy Nash equilibria in random multi-team gamesNash equilibria of Cauchy-random zero-sum and coordination matrix gamesOn the probability of existence of pure equilibria in matrix gamesOn the distribution of pure strategy equilibria in finite games with vector payoffsOn the number of pure strategy Nash equilibria in finite common payoffs gamesGeneric \(4\times 4\) two person games have at most 15 Nash equilibriaOn the number of pure strategy Nash equilibria in random gamesOn Random Symmetric Bimatrix GamesCooperation and self-interest: Pareto-inefficiency of Nash equilibria in finite random gamesPure Nash Equilibria and Best-Response Dynamics in Random Games



Cites Work


This page was built for publication: Limiting distributions of the number of pure strategy Nash equilibria in \(n\)-person games