On the distribution of pure strategy equilibria in finite games with vector payoffs

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(96)00826-8zbMath0916.90285MaRDI QIDQ1277455

William G. Stanford

Publication date: 30 June 1999

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

central limit theoremPoisson approximationsdependent random variablesvector payoffsfinite gamespure strategy equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (4)

Best-response dynamics, playing sequences, and convergence to equilibrium in random games ⋮ The number of pure Nash equilibria in a random game with nondecreasing best responses ⋮ On the number of pure strategy Nash equilibria in random games ⋮ Pure Nash Equilibria and Best-Response Dynamics in Random Games

Cites Work

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• An analog of the minimax theorem for vector payoffs
• Two moments suffice for Poisson approximations: The Chen-Stein method
• Poisson approximation for dependent trials
• Poisson approximation and the Chen-Stein method. With comments and a rejoinder by the authors
• A note on the probability of \(k\) pure Nash equilibria in matrix games
• Limiting distributions of the number of pure strategy Nash equilibria in \(n\)-person games
• Non-cooperative games
• The Probability of a Saddlepoint
• The Number of Outcomes in the Pareto-Optimal Set of Discrete Bargaining Games
• The probability of an equilibrium point
• Probability of a pure equilibrium point in n-person games

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