When ``better is better than ``best
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Publication:2661634
DOI10.1016/j.orl.2021.01.009OpenAlexW3124955636MaRDI QIDQ2661634
Kais Hamza, Ben Amiet, Andrea Collevecchio
Publication date: 7 April 2021
Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2011.00239
Related Items (1)
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