On the structure of weakly acyclic games

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Publication:372989

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-16170-4_12zbMATH Open1290.91016arXiv1108.2092OpenAlexW2568233966MaRDI QIDQ372989FDOQ372989


Authors: Alex Fabrikant, Aaron D. Jaggard, Michael Schapira Edit this on Wikidata


Publication date: 21 October 2013

Published in: Theory of Computing Systems, Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: The class of weakly acyclic games, which includes potential games and dominance-solvable games, captures many practical application domains. In a weakly acyclic game, from any starting state, there is a sequence of better-response moves that leads to a pure Nash equilibrium; informally, these are games in which natural distributed dynamics, such as better-response dynamics, cannot enter inescapable oscillations. We establish a novel link between such games and the existence of pure Nash equilibria in subgames. Specifically, we show that the existence of a unique pure Nash equilibrium in every subgame implies the weak acyclicity of a game. In contrast, the possible existence of multiple pure Nash equilibria in every subgame is insufficient for weak acyclicity in general; here, we also systematically identify the special cases (in terms of the number of players and strategies) for which this is sufficient to guarantee weak acyclicity.


Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1108.2092




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