Strong and Weak Acyclicity in Iterative Voting

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-53354-3_15zbMath1403.91132MaRDI QIDQ2819458

Reshef Meir

Publication date: 29 September 2016

Published in: Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53354-3_15

zbMATH Keywords

iterative voting; acyclicity in games; iterative games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A43: Games involving graphs

91B12: Voting theory

91A20: Multistage and repeated games

Related Items

Iterative voting and acyclic games, Strong and Weak Acyclicity in Iterative Voting

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