Acyclic, or totally tight, two-person game forms: characterization and main properties

DOI10.1016/j.disc.2009.11.009zbMath1203.91007OpenAlexW1987513456WikidataQ59560547 ScholiaQ59560547MaRDI QIDQ966009

Endre Boros, Kazuhisa Makino, David Papp, Vladimir A. Gurvich

Publication date: 27 April 2010

Published in: Discrete Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.disc.2009.11.009

zbMATH Keywords

tightacyclicNash-solvabilitytotally tightimprovement cycleeffectivity functiongame formassignabledominance-solvable

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05)

Related Items

Iterative voting and acyclic games ⋮ Total tightness implies Nash-solvability for three-person game forms ⋮ Computing lexicographically safe Nash equilibria in finite two-person games with tight game forms given by oracles ⋮ Separable discrete functions: recognition and sufficient conditions ⋮ Sufficient conditions for the existence of Nash equilibria in bimatrix games in terms of forbidden \(2 \times 2\) subgames ⋮ Acyclicity of improvements in finite game forms ⋮ Acyclic, or totally tight, two-person game forms: characterization and main properties ⋮ On effectivity functions of game forms ⋮ Strong and Weak Acyclicity in Iterative Voting

Uses Software

• JBool

Cites Work

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