Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
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Publication:3853384
DOI10.2307/1914004zbMath0419.90011OpenAlexW2060821549WikidataQ56609427 ScholiaQ56609427MaRDI QIDQ3853384
Publication date: 1979
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1914004
Nash equilibriumsocial choicegame theoretic modeldominance solvabilitygame in normal formgame in strategic formd-solutiondictatorial voting schemesdominance solvable voting schemesking-maker voting schemesveto voting
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