Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
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Publication:3853384
DOI10.2307/1914004zbMath0419.90011WikidataQ56609427 ScholiaQ56609427MaRDI QIDQ3853384
Publication date: 1979
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1914004
Nash equilibrium; social choice; game theoretic model; dominance solvability; game in normal form; game in strategic form; d-solution; dictatorial voting schemes; dominance solvable voting schemes; king-maker voting schemes; veto voting
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