Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
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Publication:3853384
DOI10.2307/1914004zbMATH Open0419.90011OpenAlexW2060821549WikidataQ56609427 ScholiaQ56609427MaRDI QIDQ3853384FDOQ3853384
Authors: Hervé Moulin 
Publication date: 1979
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1914004
game theoretic modelNash equilibriumsocial choicedominance solvabilitygame in normal formgame in strategic formd-solutiondictatorial voting schemesdominance solvable voting schemesking-maker voting schemesveto voting
Cited In (86)
- Iterated weak dominance in strictly competitive games of perfect information.
- Non-cooperative implementation: A survey of recent results
- Comparative static effects of number of bidders and public information on behavior in second-price common value auctions
- Social Choice Theory
- Iterated elimination procedures
- Invitation games: an experimental approach to coalition formation
- Subgame perfect implementation: a full characterization
- Formal versus informal legislative bargaining
- Strong and coalition-proof political equilibria under plurality and runoff rule
- Storable votes
- ``Cautious utility maximation and iterated weak dominance
- A theory of iterative choice in lists
- Total tightness implies Nash-solvability for three-person game forms
- A foundation for strategic agenda voting
- Strategic, sincere, and heuristic voting under four election rules: an experimental study
- Implementing a public project and distributing its cost
- Cyclic tournaments and cooperative majority voting: A solution
- Acyclic, or totally tight, two-person game forms: characterization and main properties
- Dominance solvability and Cournot stability
- Maximum games, dominance solvability, and coordination
- Symmetric bidding in second-price, common-value auctions
- On rationalizability in extensive games
- Implementation of voting operators
- Implementability via protective equilibria
- The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
- A general solution to King Solomon's dilemma
- Cournot tâtonnement and dominance solvability in finite games
- Voting games of resolute social choice correspondences
- Iterated weak dominance and subgame dominance
- Divide the dollar: Three solutions and extensions
- On enforcing socially best alternatives of binary group decision rules
- Choosing from a tournament
- On the order of eliminating dominated strategies
- Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency
- Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
- Order independence for iterated weak dominance
- The basic approval voting game
- Two-person pairwise solvable games
- Implementing efficient, anonymous and neutral social choice functions
- Implementation via backward induction
- Iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies in binary voting agendas with sequential voting
- Coordination on saddle-path solutions: the eductive viewpoint -- linear multivariate models
- Dominance-solvable common-value large auctions
- On the equivalence of weak dominance and sequential best response
- A social choice rule and its implementation in perfect equilibrium
- Dimensions of election procedures: Analyses and comparisons
- Research in decision theory: A personal perspective
- Implementing alternative voting in kingmaker trees
- On dominance solvable auctions in the general symmetric model
- Competition for procurement shares
- On the inconsistency of certain axioms on solution concepts for non- cooperative games
- The welfare consequences of strategic voting in two commonly used parliamentary agendas
- Dominance solvability of dynamic bargaining games
- Dominance elimination procedures on finite alternative games
- Electing a parliament
- Prudence versus sophistication in voting strategy
- Aggregation of preferences: The fuzzy case
- Cognitive hierarchy and voting manipulation in \(k\)-approval voting
- Stable equilibria and forward induction
- Dominance solvable games and trees
- Social systems analysis
- Scoring rule voting games and dominance solvability
- Chess-like games are dominance solvable in at most two steps
- Dominance solvable English matching auctions.
- Separable discrete functions: recognition and sufficient conditions
- Strategic cautiousness as an expression of robustness to ambiguity
- Cautious belief and iterated admissibility
- Recognizing distributed approval voting forms and correspondences
- Implementation theory
- Polyequilibrium
- Comprehensive rationalizability
- Incentive-based fault-tolerant cooperative payoff design in weakly acyclic games
- Equilibria of plurality voting: lazy and truth-biased voters
- A proposal for sharing costs
- To fight or not to fight? That is the question
- Equilibrium and dominance in fuzzy games
- The role of aggregate information in a binary threshold game
- Gibbard-Satterthwaite games for \(k\)-approval voting rules
- Beyond the Spanish MIR with consent: (hidden) cooperation and coordination in matching
- Unique stable matchings
- Voting with interdependent values: the Condorcet winner
- Characterising scoring rules by their solution in iteratively undominated strategies
- Inspired and inspiring: Hervé Moulin and the discovery of the beauty contest game
- Characterization of tie-breaking plurality rules
- Cooperation in games and epistemic readings of independence-friendly sentences
- The trembling chairman paradox
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