``Cautious utility maximation and iterated weak dominance

DOI10.1007/BF01240249zbMath0762.90091OpenAlexW2069442054MaRDI QIDQ1196700

Larry Samuelson, Tilman Börgers

Publication date: 16 January 1993

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01240249

zbMATH Keywords

expected utilityrational playerscautious beliefstwo-player noncooperative game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Utility theory (91B16)

Related Items

The power of paradox: some recent developments in interactive epistemology ⋮ Admissibility and common belief. ⋮ Observability, dominance, and induction in learning models ⋮ On the epistemic foundation for iterated weak dominance: an analysis in a logic of individual and collective attitudes ⋮ Rationality and the definition of consistent pairs ⋮ Iterated strict dominance in general games ⋮ A minimal logic for interactive epistemology ⋮ Comprehensive rationalizability ⋮ Self-admissible sets ⋮ Stable equilibrium in beliefs in extensive games with perfect information ⋮ Characterizing permissibility, proper rationalizability, and iterated admissibility by incomplete information ⋮ On the foundation of stability ⋮ Chess-like games are dominance solvable in at most two steps ⋮ Dominance solvable English matching auctions.

Cites Work

• Information dependent games: can common sense be common knowledge?
• On the non-existence of a rationality definition for extensive games
• Dominated strategies and common knowledge
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
• Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria
• Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria

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