Iterated strict dominance in general games
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Publication:2462288
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2007.02.002zbMath1271.91010OpenAlexW2166717043MaRDI QIDQ2462288
Xiao Luo, Yi-Chun Chen, Ngo Van Long
Publication date: 30 November 2007
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://cirano.qc.ca/files/publications/2007s-03.pdf
Nash equilibriumwell-ordering principlestrict dominanceiterated eliminationReny's better-reply secure games
Related Items (22)
Common belief in rationality in psychological games. Belief-dependent utility and the limits of strategic reasoning ⋮ Rationalizability in general situations ⋮ Interim correlated rationalizability in infinite games ⋮ Formalizing common belief with no underlying assumption on individual beliefs ⋮ Non-Bayesian correlated equilibrium as an expression of non-Bayesian rationality ⋮ Rationalizable strategies in games with incomplete preferences ⋮ The existence of universal qualitative belief spaces ⋮ Iterated bounded dominance ⋮ Order independence for rationalizability ⋮ Possibilistic beliefs in strategic games ⋮ Rationalizability in games with a continuum of players ⋮ The reasoning-based expected utility procedure ⋮ Iterated elimination procedures ⋮ An indistinguishability result on rationalizability under general preferences ⋮ A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies ⋮ AN EPISTEMIC RATIONALE FOR ORDER INDEPENDENCE ⋮ On the equivalence between iterated application of choice rules and common belief of applying these rules ⋮ Bayesian coalitional rationalizability ⋮ Dominance rationality: a unified approach ⋮ Rational altruism? On preference estimation and dictator game experiments ⋮ The foundation of stability in extensive games with perfect information ⋮ The role of monotonicity in the epistemic analysis of strategic games
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