Formalizing common belief with no underlying assumption on individual beliefs

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2020.02.007zbMATH Open1437.91143OpenAlexW3006806343WikidataQ114668048 ScholiaQ114668048MaRDI QIDQ2173395FDOQ2173395

Authors: Satoshi Fukuda 

Publication date: 22 April 2020

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.02.007

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zbMATH Keywords

common knowledgecommon beliefnon-monotonic reasoninglogical omnisciencestrict dominancecommon bases

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cites Work

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Cited In (7)

• Common belief of weak-dominance rationality in strategic-form games: a qualitative analysis
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• On the consistency among prior, posteriors, and information sets
• Are the players in an interactive belief model meta-certain of the model itself?
• On the axiomatization of an unawareness structure from knowing-whether operators
• Comment of consensus without common knowledge
• The existence of universal qualitative belief spaces

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