Strong completeness theorems for weak logics of common belief
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Publication:1810818
DOI10.1023/A:1023032105687zbMath1027.03013OpenAlexW2001913951MaRDI QIDQ1810818
Publication date: 9 June 2003
Published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1023032105687
Related Items (5)
Philippe Mongin 1950--2020 ⋮ Formalizing common belief with no underlying assumption on individual beliefs ⋮ The doctrinal paradox, the discursive dilemma, and logical aggregation theory ⋮ The premiss-based approach to judgment aggregation ⋮ Philippe Mongin (1950-2020)
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