A non-minimal but very weak axiomatization of common belief

DOI10.1016/0004-3702(94)90111-2zbMath0811.03023OpenAlexW2148410644MaRDI QIDQ1342230

Luc Lismont, Philippe Mongin

Publication date: 11 January 1995

Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0004-3702(94)90111-2

zbMATH Keywords

modal logicaxiomatizationcommon beliefneighbourhood semantics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Modal logic (including the logic of norms) (03B45) Other nonclassical logic (03B60) Logic in artificial intelligence (68T27)

Related Items (7)

Belief closure: A semantics of common knowledge for modal propositional logic ⋮ Formalizing common belief with no underlying assumption on individual beliefs ⋮ Non-normal modalities in variants of linear logic ⋮ Probability logic for type spaces ⋮ Philippe Mongin (1950-2020) ⋮ Strong completeness theorems for weak logics of common belief ⋮ A sound interpretation of minimality properties of common belief in minimal semantics

Cites Work

• Belief, awareness, and limited reasoning
• Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
• Impossible possible worlds vindicated
• Knowledge and common knowledge in a distributed environment
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item

This page was built for publication: A non-minimal but very weak axiomatization of common belief