A non-minimal but very weak axiomatization of common belief

DOI10.1016/0004-3702(94)90111-2MaRDI QIDQ1342230zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Luc Lismont, Philippe Mongin

Publication date 11 January 1995

Published in Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0004-3702(94)90111-2

zbMATH Keywords

axiomatizationcommon beliefmodal logicneighbourhood semantics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Modal logic (including the logic of norms) (03B45) Other nonclassical logic (03B60) Logic in artificial intelligence (68T27)

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• On the Logic of Common Belief
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Cites work

• Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
• Belief, awareness, and limited reasoning
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4181308 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3670430 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 795590 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1453143 (Why is no real title available?)
• Impossible possible worlds vindicated
• Knowledge and common knowledge in a distributed environment

Cited in

(14)

• Common belief in monotonic epistemic logic
• On the logic of common belief and common knowledge
• Belief closure: A semantics of common knowledge for modal propositional logic
• Strong completeness theorems for weak logics of common belief
• Approximating agreeing to disagree results with common \(p\)-beliefs
• Philippe Mongin (1950-2020)
• Formalizing common belief with no underlying assumption on individual beliefs
• A sound interpretation of minimality properties of common belief in minimal semantics
• Non-normal modalities in variants of linear logic
• On the Logic of Common Belief
• Common Belief with the Logic of Individual Belief
• Probability logic for type spaces
• Non-normal Modal description logics
• On the axiomatization of an unawareness structure from knowing-whether operators

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