Belief closure: A semantics of common knowledge for modal propositional logic

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(95)00785-KzbMATH Open0886.90063OpenAlexW2048218250MaRDI QIDQ1377482FDOQ1377482

Authors: Luc Lismont, Philippe Mongin 

Publication date: 26 January 1998

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(95)00785-k

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zbMATH Keywords

common beliefepistemic modal logic

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Mathematical economics (91B99)

Cites Work

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Cited In (19)

• Formal semantics for mutual belief
• Being realistic about common knowledge: a lewisian approach
• Strong completeness theorems for weak logics of common belief
• Common belief in monotonic epistemic logic
• On the logic of common belief and common knowledge
• Iterative and fixed point common belief
• Philippe Mongin (1950-2020)
• On the logic and role of negative introspection of common belief
• Common knowledge: Relating anti-founded situation semantics to modal logic neighbourhood semantics
• A modal logic of intentional communication
• Closure of a priori knowability under a priori knowable material implication
• Common Knowledge and the Knowledge Account of Assertion
• On the axiomatization of an unawareness structure from knowing-whether operators
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The many faces of closure and introspection. An ineractive perspective
• Refined common knowledge logics or logics of common information
• Formalizing common belief with no underlying assumption on individual beliefs
• Common knowledge logic and game logic
• Assessing the truth axiom under incomplete information

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