Being realistic about common knowledge: a lewisian approach

DOI10.1007/S11229-010-9770-YzbMATH Open1235.03015OpenAlexW2081622834MaRDI QIDQ408339FDOQ408339

Cedric Paternotte

Publication date: 5 April 2012

Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-010-9770-y

zbMATH Keywords

rationalitycommon knowledgeDavid Lewisfallibilismprobabilistic belief

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cites Work

• Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
• Agreeing to disagree
• Belief closure: A semantics of common knowledge for modal propositional logic
• Margin for error and the transparency of knowledge
• Approximate common knowledge and co-ordination: Recent lessons from game theory
• Approximate common knowledge revisited
• Common knowledge: Relating anti-founded situation semantics to modal logic neighbourhood semantics
• Inexact knowledge with introspection
• A logical framework for convention
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (4)

• Salience reasoning in coordination games
• Community-based reasoning in games: salience, rule-following, and counterfactuals
• The fragility of common knowledge
• Practical reasoning, rule-following and belief revision: an account in terms of Jeffrey's rule

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