Margin for error and the transparency of knowledge

DOI10.1007/S11229-007-9245-YMaRDI QIDQ1024137zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jérôme Dokic, Paul Égré

Publication date 16 June 2009

Published in Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/ijn_00000479/file/marginFE_de_penultimate.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

epistemic logicepistemic logical principle KKepistemic paradoxesmargin for error principlesnon-perceptual knowledgeperceptual knowledge

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42)

Review text

The authors first describe an argument, originally formulated by T. Williamson, against the so-called epistemic transparency principle KK of epistemic logic. The argument is a reductio: from the description of a situation of approximate knowledge, it is shown that a contradiction can be derived on the basis of KK and additional epistemic principles which are, according to Williamson, better grounded. Next, the authors distinguish two sorts of knowledge (viz., perceptual and reflective knowledge), provide criteria for the distinction, and on the basis of this distinction they consider different readings of the principles involved in Williamson's argument. They show that only certain readings are plausible; but under the plausible readings, Williamson's argument no longer yields a contradiction. Another reductio argument against KK formulated by Williamson, similar in structure to the former argument, is also analyzed and solved by the authors by appealing again to a distinction of types of knowledge. The authors' general conclusion is that Williamson's reductio arguments rest on an inappropriate identification of forms of knowledge, which according to the authors are constrained in different ways. Finally, they discuss non-perceptual knowledge in relation to margin for error principles in order to provide additional support to their analysis as well as offer replies to possible objections to the their proposal.

Recommendations

• Transparency and the KK principle
• The KK-principle, margins for error, and safety
• A defense of temperate epistemic transparency
• Williamson, closure, and KK
• Knowledge-to-fact arguments (bootstrapping, closure, paradox and KK)

Cites work

• Epistemology without knowledge and without belief
• Inexact knowledge with introspection
• Intensional logics without iterative axioms
• Knowing One’s Limits: An Analysis in Centered Dynamic Epistemic Logic
• Verificaton, falsification, and cancellation in KT

Cited in

(15)

• Hope, knowledge, and blindspots
• The KK-principle, margins for error, and safety
• A defense of temperate epistemic transparency
• Inexact knowledge with introspection
• Margin for error semantics and signal perception
• Williamson, closure, and KK
• Knowing One’s Limits: An Analysis in Centered Dynamic Epistemic Logic
• Being realistic about common knowledge: a lewisian approach
• Transparency and the KK principle
• (Un)knowability and knowledge iteration
• Why transparency undermines economy
• Knowledge-to-fact arguments (bootstrapping, closure, paradox and KK)
• Inexact knowledge and dynamic introspection
• If you don't know that you know, you could be surprised
• Losing confidence in luminosity

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