Margin for error and the transparency of knowledge (Q1024137)

The authors first describe an argument, originally formulated by T. Williamson, against the so-called epistemic transparency principle KK of epistemic logic. The argument is a reductio: from the description of a situation of approximate knowledge, it is shown that a contradiction can be derived on the basis of KK and additional epistemic principles which are, according to Williamson, better grounded. Next, the authors distinguish two sorts of knowledge (viz., perceptual and reflective knowledge), provide criteria for the distinction, and on the basis of this distinction they consider different readings of the principles involved in Williamson's argument. They show that only certain readings are plausible; but under the plausible readings, Williamson's argument no longer yields a contradiction. Another reductio argument against KK formulated by Williamson, similar in structure to the former argument, is also analyzed and solved by the authors by appealing again to a distinction of types of knowledge. The authors' general conclusion is that Williamson's reductio arguments rest on an inappropriate identification of forms of knowledge, which according to the authors are constrained in different ways. Finally, they discuss non-perceptual knowledge in relation to margin for error principles in order to provide additional support to their analysis as well as offer replies to possible objections to the their proposal.