Final decisions, the Nash equilibrium and solvability in games with common knowledge of logical abilities

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(91)90024-LzbMath0743.90120MaRDI QIDQ1181755

Mamoru Kaneko, Takashi Nagashima

Publication date: 27 June 1992

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

solvability; Nash equilibrium; subsolution; game logic; one-shot play

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

03B80: Other applications of logic

Related Items

The logical representation of extensive games, On the logic and role of negative introspection of common belief, Belief closure: A semantics of common knowledge for modal propositional logic, Epistemic considerations of decision making in games, Game logic and its applications. I

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