Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game

Cited In (only showing first 100 items - show all)

Universally rational belief hierarchies
Licensing and the sharing of knowledge in research joint ventures
Common belief and common knowledge
Repeated games with incomplete information
Knightian games and robustness to ambiguity
Peter J. Hammond
Belief and truth in hypothesised behaviours
Average behavior in learning models
Incentives and the existence of Pareto-optimal revelation mechanisms
Ambiguous language and common priors
Final decisions, the Nash equilibrium and solvability in games with common knowledge of logical abilities
Games with incomplete information and uncertain payoff: from the perspective of uncertainty theory
Asymmetric auction experiments with(out) commonly known beliefs
A new theory of equilibrium selection for games with complete information
A model of electoral competition with incomplete information
Who wants to break the hockey-stick sales pattern in the supply chain?
Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and Bertrand
Psychological games and sequential rationality
Bilateral trade with the sealed bid k-double auction: Existence and efficiency
Equilibria of the sealed-bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information
Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
Equilibrium without independence
Ex ante incentive efficient trading mechanisms without the private valuation restriction
Existence of optimal auctions in general environments
Coalitional game with fuzzy payoffs and credibilistic core
Optimal research for Cournot oligopolists
Infrastructure security games
Title not available (Why is that?)
Elections with limited information: A fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources
On the existence of pure-strategy equilibria in games with private information: a complete characterization
Games with incomplete information when players are partially aware of others' signals
The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
Static game theory models and their applications in management science
Continuous implementation of constrained rational expectations equilibria
The positive value of information
Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice
Bayesian Games: Games with Incomplete Information
Incentive compatibility and incomplete information
Pollution claim settlements under private information
An axiomatic theory of a risk dominance measure for bipolar games with linear incentives
Dynamic consistency in incomplete information games under ambiguity
Agreeing to Disagree
The value of information in a simple duopoly model
Near-Nash equilibrium strategies for LQ differential games with inaccurate state information
Reputation in repeated second-price auctions
The reeded edge and the Phillips curve: Money neutrality, common knowledge, and subjective beliefs
Some extensions of a claim of Aumann in an axiomatic model of knowledge
Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty
The rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases: An asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms
Coherent beliefs are not always types.
Bayesian Nash equilibria using extended Werner-like states
Dynamic pricing of call rates: Bayesian approach
Perception and information in a competitive location model
Continuous implementation in economies with incomplete information
Minimax-regret strategies for bargaining over several variables
Bayesian learning and convergence to rational expectations
On a theorem of Schmeidler
Semidefinite complementarity reformulation for robust Nash equilibrium problems with Euclidean uncertainty sets
Simultaneous offers and the inefficiency of bargaining: A two-period example
Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
On the duality between prior beliefs and trading demands
Optimal management of durable pollution
Common knowledge with probability 1
Stackelberg-solvable games and pre-play communication
Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
Reputation and imperfect information
From classical to epistemic game theory
Autonomous agents modelling other agents: a comprehensive survey and open problems
Multiple goal non-cooperative conflicts under uncertainty: A fuzzy set approach
Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences
Coherent behavior in noncooperative games
On ring formation in auctions
Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
Bayesian incentive compatible beliefs
Implementation in differential information economies
Rational expectations equilibrium: An alternative approach
Technological competition, uncertainty, and oligopoly
The \textit{ex ante} \(\alpha\)-core for normal form games with uncertainty
Believing in correlated types in spite of independence: an indirect evolutionary analysis
The information operation in a repeated n-person nonzero-sum game
Distributed algorithms for the computation of noncooperative equilibria
Environmental game modeling with uncertainties
THE PEDESTRIAN PRINCIPLE FOR DIFFERENTIAL GAMES
Charges and bets: a general characterisation of common priors
Modelling incomplete information in Boolean games using possibilistic logic
Adversarial risk analysis: Borel games
Coordinated replenishment game and learning under time dependency and uncertainty of the parameters
Risk management in hierarchical games with random factors
Linear spaces of games on the unit square with pure equilibrium points
Gratitude, conscience, and reciprocity: models of supplier motivation when quality is non-contractible
Adversarial classification using signaling games with an application to phishing detection
Optimal allocation of MRI scan capacity among competing hospital departments
Conjectures and underpricing in repeated mass disputes with heterogeneous plaintiffs
To fight or not to fight? That is the question
Bayesian learning in fish wars: dynamic estimation of unknown states and private information
On the completeness of the universal knowledge-belief space: a technical note
Inequality and procedural justice in social dilemmas
A parametric family of two ranked objects auctions: equilibria and associated risk
Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. I. Key concepts and classical results
An indirect evolutionary justification of risk neutral bidding in fair division games

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