Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
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Publication:5564028
DOI10.1287/mnsc.14.7.486zbMath0177.48501OpenAlexW2044155094MaRDI QIDQ5564028
Publication date: 1968
Published in: Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.14.7.486
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