Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game

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Perception and information in a competitive location model
Continuous implementation in economies with incomplete information
Minimax-regret strategies for bargaining over several variables
One-sided adaptation for infinite-horizon linear quadraticN-person non-zero-sum dynamic games and sensitivity analysis
Bayesian learning and convergence to rational expectations
Are the players in an interactive belief model meta-certain of the model itself?
On a theorem of Schmeidler
Semidefinite complementarity reformulation for robust Nash equilibrium problems with Euclidean uncertainty sets
Nonlocal correlations and noise in different settings of a two-player game
Simultaneous offers and the inefficiency of bargaining: A two-period example
Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
A rough view on incomplete information in games
Three-player conflicting interest games and nonlocality
On the duality between prior beliefs and trading demands
Optimal management of durable pollution
Belief-independence and (robust) strategy-proofness
Computational efficiency in multivariate adversarial risk analysis models
A robust optimization approach for solving two-person games under interval uncertainty
Pricing, routing, and incentive compatibility in multiserver queues
Linear spaces of games on the unit square with pure equilibrium points
Common knowledge with probability 1
Stackelberg-solvable games and pre-play communication
Network routing for insurgency: an adversarial risk analysis framework
Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
Reputation and imperfect information
The design of a tort law to control accidents
Classical statistics as a theory of incentives
Optimum/near-optimum incentive policies for stochastic decision problems involving parametric uncertainty
Periodic strategies. II: Generalizations and extensions
Modelling the role of information in elections
From classical to epistemic game theory
Robust games: theory and application to a Cournot duopoly model
Coalition formation of oligopolistic firms for information exchange
Some remarks on Bayesian mechanism design
Autonomous agents modelling other agents: a comprehensive survey and open problems
Static games
Multiple goal non-cooperative conflicts under uncertainty: A fuzzy set approach
Complete conditional type structures
Strategic ambiguity in global games
Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types
Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences
The return function: a new computable perspective on Bayesian-Nash equilibria
Similarity of games with incomplete information
Coherent behavior in noncooperative games
An epistemic approach to stochastic games
Epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium
On ring formation in auctions
The existence of universal qualitative belief spaces
Modeling, analysis, and dynamics of Bayesian games via matrix-based method
Universal knowledge-belief structures
Bayesian incentive compatible beliefs
Implementation in differential information economies
Rational expectations equilibrium: An alternative approach
Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
Believing in correlated types in spite of independence: an indirect evolutionary analysis
Distributed algorithms for the computation of noncooperative equilibria
Technological competition, uncertainty, and oligopoly
The \textit{ex ante} \(\alpha\)-core for normal form games with uncertainty
The information operation in a repeated n-person nonzero-sum game
Environmental game modeling with uncertainties
Licensing and the sharing of knowledge in research joint ventures
Charges and bets: a general characterisation of common priors
THE PEDESTRIAN PRINCIPLE FOR DIFFERENTIAL GAMES
Common belief and common knowledge
Modelling incomplete information in Boolean games using possibilistic logic
Universally rational belief hierarchies
Knightian games and robustness to ambiguity
Repeated games with incomplete information
Adversarial risk analysis: Borel games
Peter J. Hammond
Belief and truth in hypothesised behaviours
Risk management in hierarchical games with random factors
Average behavior in learning models
Incentives and the existence of Pareto-optimal revelation mechanisms
Coordinated replenishment game and learning under time dependency and uncertainty of the parameters
Final decisions, the Nash equilibrium and solvability in games with common knowledge of logical abilities
Linear spaces of games on the unit square with pure equilibrium points
Gratitude, conscience, and reciprocity: models of supplier motivation when quality is non-contractible
Adversarial classification using signaling games with an application to phishing detection
Ambiguous language and common priors
Games with incomplete information and uncertain payoff: from the perspective of uncertainty theory
Asymmetric auction experiments with(out) commonly known beliefs
Optimal allocation of MRI scan capacity among competing hospital departments
A model of electoral competition with incomplete information
A new theory of equilibrium selection for games with complete information
Who wants to break the hockey-stick sales pattern in the supply chain?
Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and Bertrand
To fight or not to fight? That is the question
Psychological games and sequential rationality
Bilateral trade with the sealed bid k-double auction: Existence and efficiency
Equilibria of the sealed-bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information
Conjectures and underpricing in repeated mass disputes with heterogeneous plaintiffs
Equilibrium without independence
Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
Ex ante incentive efficient trading mechanisms without the private valuation restriction
Existence of optimal auctions in general environments
Bayesian learning in fish wars: dynamic estimation of unknown states and private information
Coalitional game with fuzzy payoffs and credibilistic core
On the completeness of the universal knowledge-belief space: a technical note
A parametric family of two ranked objects auctions: equilibria and associated risk

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