Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game

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Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. I. Key concepts and classical results
The design of a tort law to control accidents
On a theorem of Schmeidler
Optimum/near-optimum incentive policies for stochastic decision problems involving parametric uncertainty
Coalition formation of oligopolistic firms for information exchange
The value of information in a simple duopoly model
Some extensions of a claim of Aumann in an axiomatic model of knowledge
Implementation in differential information economies
Elections with limited information: A fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources
Optimal research for Cournot oligopolists
Distributed algorithms for the computation of noncooperative equilibria
Bayesian learning and convergence to rational expectations
Common knowledge with probability 1
Reputation in repeated second-price auctions
The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
Equilibria of the sealed-bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information
Static game theory models and their applications in management science
Bilateral trade with the sealed bid k-double auction: Existence and efficiency
The rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases: An asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms
Stackelberg-solvable games and pre-play communication
Irregular gaming areas
Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
Bayesian incentive compatible beliefs
Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
Reputation and imperfect information
Similarity of games with incomplete information
Ex ante incentive efficient trading mechanisms without the private valuation restriction
Final decisions, the Nash equilibrium and solvability in games with common knowledge of logical abilities
Licensing and the sharing of knowledge in research joint ventures
Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences
Psychological games and sequential rationality
Classical statistics as a theory of incentives
The positive value of information
Continuous implementation in economies with incomplete information
Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice
A note on conflict resolution and truthtelling
Modelling the role of information in elections
Average behavior in learning models
Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
Incentive compatibility and incomplete information
Minimax-regret strategies for bargaining over several variables
Pollution claim settlements under private information
Pricing, routing, and incentive compatibility in multiserver queues
To fight or not to fight? That is the question
On ring formation in auctions
Perception and information in a competitive location model
On the logic and role of negative introspection of common belief
Existence of optimal auctions in general environments
The reeded edge and the Phillips curve: Money neutrality, common knowledge, and subjective beliefs
Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types
Autonomous agents modelling other agents: a comprehensive survey and open problems
Psychology of game playing: introduction to a special issue
Robust games: theory and application to a Cournot duopoly model
Three-player conflicting interest games and nonlocality
Modelling incomplete information in Boolean games using possibilistic logic
Gratitude, conscience, and reciprocity: models of supplier motivation when quality is non-contractible
Adversarial classification using signaling games with an application to phishing detection
On the duality between prior beliefs and trading demands
Auctions, public tenders, and fair division games: An axiomatic approach
Technological competition, uncertainty, and oligopoly
A new theory of equilibrium selection for games with complete information
An axiomatic theory of a risk dominance measure for bipolar games with linear incentives
The work of John F. Nash Jr. in game theory. Nobel seminar, 8 December 1994
An early paper on the refinement of Nash equilibrium
Optimal allocation of MRI scan capacity among competing hospital departments
Asymmetric auction experiments with(out) commonly known beliefs
The \textit{ex ante} \(\alpha\)-core for normal form games with uncertainty
Coherent beliefs are not always types.
An indirect evolutionary justification of risk neutral bidding in fair division games
Meet meets join: the interaction between pooled and common knowledge
John C. Harsanyi
Peter J. Hammond
Linear spaces of games on the unit square with pure equilibrium points
Agreeing to disagree with conditional probability systems
Charges and bets: a general characterisation of common priors
A robust optimization approach for solving two-person games under interval uncertainty
Agency equilibrium
Countable spaces and common priors
The non-existence of a universal topological type space
The return function: a new computable perspective on Bayesian-Nash equilibria
Environmental game modeling with uncertainties
Risk management in hierarchical games with random factors
Ambiguous language and common priors
A parametric family of two ranked objects auctions: equilibria and associated risk
Almost common priors
Uncertain information structures and backward induction
An epistemic approach to stochastic games
On the existence of pure-strategy equilibria in games with private information: a complete characterization
Universal knowledge-belief structures
The coming of game theory
Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
Continuous implementation of constrained rational expectations equilibria
Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty
Data envelopment analysis approaches for two-level production and distribution planning problems
Nonlocal correlations and noise in different settings of a two-player game
Belief and truth in hypothesised behaviours
The information operation in a repeated n-person nonzero-sum game
Adversarial risk analysis: Borel games
Agent connectedness and backward induction
Agreeing to Disagree

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