Auctions, public tenders, and fair division games: An axiomatic approach
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Publication:1821045
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3731791 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- A comparison of pricing rules for auctions and fair division games
- Fair Net Trades
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
- Optimal Auction Design
- The Conditional Auction Mechanism for Sharing a Surplus
Cited in
(6)- Similarities in axiomatizations: equal surplus division value and first-price auctions
- Dual auctions for assigning winners and compensating losers
- Community projects: an experimental analysis of a fair implementation process
- An indirect evolutionary justification of risk neutral bidding in fair division games
- A comparison of pricing rules for auctions and fair division games
- On ring formation in auctions
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