An indirect evolutionary justification of risk neutral bidding in fair division games

DOI10.1007/S00182-020-00739-9MaRDI QIDQ2021786zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Paul Pezanis-Christou, Werner Güth

Publication date 27 April 2021

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://media.adelaide.edu.au/economics/papers/doc/wp2018-09.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary stable strategiesfair divisionrisk neutrality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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Cites work

• A comparison of pricing rules for auctions and fair division games
• Amicable divorce: Dissolving a partnership with simple mechanisms
• Asymmetric price-benefits auctions
• Auctions, public tenders, and fair division games: An axiomatic approach
• Believing in correlated types in spite of independence: an indirect evolutionary analysis
• Dissolving a partnership (un)fairly
• Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
• Ex-post regret heuristics under private values. I: Fixed and random matching
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3835792 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 903638 (Why is no real title available?)
• On the dynamic foundation of evolutionary stability in continuous models.

Cited in

(3)

• Believing in correlated types in spite of independence: an indirect evolutionary analysis
• Continuous action iterated dilemma with data-driven compensation network and limited learning ability
• Procedurally fair co-determination with endogeneous value uncertainty: an experiment

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