Evolution and ultimatum bargaining
From MaRDI portal
(Redirected from Evolution and ultimatum bargaining)
Recommendations
- Fairness evolution in the ultimatum game is a function of reward size
- The indirect evolutionary approach to explaining fair allocations
- Evolution of fairness in the one-shot anonymous ultimatum game
- An evolutionary model of bargaining
- EVOLUTION IN IMPERFECT COMMITMENT BARGAINING—STRATEGIC VERSUS IGNORANT TYPES
Cited in
(26)- The indirect evolutionary approach to explaining fair allocations
- Two-person bargaining experiments with incomplete information
- Aspiration adaptation in the ultimatum minigame.
- The evolutionary analysis of the ultimatum game based on the net-profit decision
- Statistical fluctuations in population bargaining in the ultimatum game: static and evolutionary aspects
- Social opportunities and the evolution of fairness
- An evolutionary model of bargaining
- The evolutionary role of toughness in bargaining
- The evolution of preferences for conflict
- An indirect evolutionary justification of risk neutral bidding in fair division games
- Randomness and arbitrary coordination in the reactive ultimatum game
- A reactive-Darwinian model for the ultimatum game: on the dominance of moderation in high diffusion
- Evolution of fairness and coalition formation in three-person ultimatum games
- No switchbacks: Rethinking aspiration-based dynamics in the ultimatum game
- The Evolution of Fairness in the Ultimatum Game
- Replicator dynamics of symmetric ultimatum game
- Sampling dynamics of a symmetric ultimatum game
- The Evolution of Bargaining Behavior
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1969727 (Why is no real title available?)
- Evolution of fairness in the one-shot anonymous ultimatum game
- EVOLUTION IN IMPERFECT COMMITMENT BARGAINING—STRATEGIC VERSUS IGNORANT TYPES
- Evolution and the ultimatum game
- ``Anything goes in an ultimatum game?
- Evolutionary dynamics of the Nash demand game: a diffusion approach
- In a weakly dominated strategy is strength: evolution of optimality in stag hunt augmented with a punishment option
- How robust is the equal split norm? Responsive strategies, selection mechanisms and the need for economic interpretation of simulation parameters
This page was built for publication: Evolution and ultimatum bargaining
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1367756)