Evolution of fairness in the one-shot anonymous Ultimatum Game

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Publication:5170996

DOI10.1073/pnas.1214167110zbMath1292.91050OpenAlexW2105347098WikidataQ36617028 ScholiaQ36617028MaRDI QIDQ5170996

Hisashi Ohtsuki, Martin A. Nowak, David G. Rand, Corina E. Tarnita

Publication date: 25 July 2014

Published in: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1214167110




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