Fairness and trust in structured populations

DOI10.3390/g6030214zbMath1402.91063OpenAlexW2162470231MaRDI QIDQ1651794

Corina E. Tarnita

Publication date: 10 July 2018

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g6030214

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary game theorypopulation structureultimatum gamereputationtrust game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Mathematical geography and demography (91D20) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (3)

Third-party punishment as a costly signal of high continuation probabilities in repeated games ⋮ Effects of update rules on networked \(N\)-player trust game dynamics ⋮ Expectations of fairness and trust co-evolve in environments of partial information

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Prosperity is associated with instability in dynamical networks
• Delayed and inconsistent information and the evolution of trust
• Mutation-selection equilibrium in games with multiple strategies
• Strategy selection in structured populations
• Mutation-selection equilibrium in games with mixed strategies
• Stochastic evolutionary dynamics of bimatrix games
• Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game
• Trust, reciprocity, and social history
• Evolution of fairness in the one-shot anonymous Ultimatum Game

This page was built for publication: Fairness and trust in structured populations