Delayed and inconsistent information and the evolution of trust

DOI10.1007/S13235-012-0055-6zbMATH Open1276.91026OpenAlexW2164094018MaRDI QIDQ385168FDOQ385168

Michael L. Manapat, David G. Rand

Publication date: 29 November 2013

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-012-0055-6

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary dynamicsreputationevolutionary game theorytrust game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

• How to identify trust and reciprocity.
• Trust, reciprocity, and social history
• Evolutionary dynamics in finite populations can explain the full range of cooperative behaviors observed in the centipede game
• Stochastic evolutionary dynamics resolve the traveler's dilemma
• Does Local Financial Development Matter?
• Evolutionarily stable co-operative commitments

Cited In (5)

• Coaction versus reciprocity in continuous-time models of cooperation
• Fairness and trust in structured populations
• Expectations of fairness and trust co-evolve in environments of partial information
• Social norms, information, and trust among strangers: theory and evidence
• Evolution of trustfulness in the case where resources for cooperation are sometimes absent

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