On the transmission of guilt aversion and the evolution of trust

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2023.09.012zbMath1530.91472MaRDI QIDQ6148410

Elena Manzoni, Fabrizio Panebianco, Sebastiano Della Lena

Publication date: 11 January 2024

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

guilt aversionpsychological gamescultural transmissiontrust and trustworthiness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10)

Cites Work

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• Evolution of Preferences1
• The economics of cultural transmission and the dynamics of preferences

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