Psychological games and sequential rationality
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Publication:1191823
DOI10.1016/0899-8256(89)90005-5zbMath0755.90109OpenAlexW2034278352MaRDI QIDQ1191823
Ennio Stacchetti, John D. Geanakoplos, David G. Pearce
Publication date: 27 September 1992
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4587.pdf
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Cites Work
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- Information dependent games: can common sense be common knowledge?
- Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- Sequential Equilibria
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
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