Lies in disguise -- a theoretical analysis of cheating

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2018.01.013zbMATH Open1422.91125OpenAlexW2590014728WikidataQ98704589 ScholiaQ98704589MaRDI QIDQ1753692FDOQ1753692

Authors: Martin Dufwenberg, Martin A. Dufwenberg 

Publication date: 29 May 2018

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp6208.pdf

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zbMATH Keywords

psychological game theorylyingcheatingcostsaudienceperceived cheating aversion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Psychological games and sequential rationality
• Dynamic psychological games
• Sequential Equilibria
• Social image and the 50-50 norm: a theoretical and experimental analysis of audience effects
• Strategic communication with lying costs
• Utility from anticipation and personal equilibrium
• Incentives and cheating
• Bad boys: how criminal identity salience affects rule violation
• Eliciting private information with noise: the case of randomized response

Cited In (18)

• Cheating husbands and other stories: A case study of knowledge, action, and communication
• The power of outside options in the presence of obstinate types
• Lying for votes
• Cheating to win: dishonesty and the intensity of competition
• Lying with heterogeneous image concerns
• Individual cheating in the lab: a new measure and external validity
• Does the die-under-the-cup device exaggerate cheating?
• Signaling motives in lying games
• Common belief in rationality in psychological games. Belief-dependent utility and the limits of strategic reasoning
• Promises and endogenous reneging costs
• The influence of self and social image concerns on lying
• How lies induced cooperation in \textit{Golden Balls}: a game-theoretic analysis
• A brand new cheating attempt: a case of usurped identity
• It's not a lie if you believe the norm does not apply: conditional norm-following and belief distortion
• Team production and esteem: a dual selves model with belief-dependent preferences
• ``But everybody's doing it!: a model of peer effects on student cheating
• Lying opportunities and incentives to Lie: reference dependence versus reputation
• Incentives and cheating

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