Lies in disguise -- a theoretical analysis of cheating
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1753692
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2018.01.013zbMATH Open1422.91125OpenAlexW2590014728WikidataQ98704589 ScholiaQ98704589MaRDI QIDQ1753692FDOQ1753692
Martin Dufwenberg, Martin A. Dufwenberg
Publication date: 29 May 2018
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp6208.pdf
Cites Work
- Psychological games and sequential rationality
- Dynamic psychological games
- Sequential Equilibria
- Social Image and the 50-50 Norm: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Audience Effects
- Strategic Communication with Lying Costs
- Utility from anticipation and personal equilibrium
- Incentives and cheating
- Bad Boys: How Criminal Identity Salience Affects Rule Violation
- Eliciting private information with noise: the case of randomized response
Cited In (12)
- Cheating husbands and other stories: A case study of knowledge, action, and communication
- The power of outside options in the presence of obstinate types
- Lying for votes
- Lying with heterogeneous image concerns
- Signaling motives in lying games
- Common belief in rationality in psychological games. Belief-dependent utility and the limits of strategic reasoning
- Promises and endogenous reneging costs
- The influence of self and social image concerns on lying
- A brand new cheating attempt: a case of usurped identity
- It's not a lie if you believe the norm does not apply: conditional norm-following and belief distortion
- Team production and esteem: a dual selves model with belief-dependent preferences
- Lying opportunities and incentives to Lie: reference dependence versus reputation
This page was built for publication: Lies in disguise -- a theoretical analysis of cheating
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1753692)
