Lies in disguise -- a theoretical analysis of cheating
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Cites work
- Bad boys: how criminal identity salience affects rule violation
- Dynamic psychological games
- Eliciting private information with noise: the case of randomized response
- Incentives and cheating
- Psychological games and sequential rationality
- Sequential Equilibria
- Social image and the 50-50 norm: a theoretical and experimental analysis of audience effects
- Strategic communication with lying costs
- Utility from anticipation and personal equilibrium
Cited in
(18)- Cheating husbands and other stories: A case study of knowledge, action, and communication
- The power of outside options in the presence of obstinate types
- Lying for votes
- Cheating to win: dishonesty and the intensity of competition
- Lying with heterogeneous image concerns
- Individual cheating in the lab: a new measure and external validity
- Does the die-under-the-cup device exaggerate cheating?
- Signaling motives in lying games
- Common belief in rationality in psychological games. Belief-dependent utility and the limits of strategic reasoning
- Promises and endogenous reneging costs
- The influence of self and social image concerns on lying
- How lies induced cooperation in \textit{Golden Balls}: a game-theoretic analysis
- A brand new cheating attempt: a case of usurped identity
- It's not a lie if you believe the norm does not apply: conditional norm-following and belief distortion
- Team production and esteem: a dual selves model with belief-dependent preferences
- ``But everybody's doing it!: a model of peer effects on student cheating
- Lying opportunities and incentives to Lie: reference dependence versus reputation
- Incentives and cheating
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