Incentives and cheating

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.01.015zbMath1409.91075OpenAlexW2588739245MaRDI QIDQ523506

Uri Gneezy, Agne Kajackaite

Publication date: 21 April 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.015

zbMATH Keywords

incentiveslaboratory experimentcheatinglying costs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (7)

Individual cheating in the lab: a new measure and external validity ⋮ It's not a lie if you believe the norm does not apply: conditional norm-following and belief distortion ⋮ Unethical decision making and sleep restriction: experimental evidence ⋮ Commitment requests do not affect truth-telling in laboratory and online experiments ⋮ Does poverty negate the impact of social norms on cheating? ⋮ Lies in disguise -- a theoretical analysis of cheating ⋮ Losing funds or losing face? Reputation and accountability in the credit rating industry

Cites Work

• Measuring beliefs in an experimental lost wallet game
• Truth or Consequences: An Experiment
• Social Image and the 50-50 Norm: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Audience Effects
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Preferences for Truth‐Telling
• Promises and Partnership

This page was built for publication: Incentives and cheating