Preferences for Truth‐Telling
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Publication:5239830
DOI10.3982/ECTA14673zbMath1426.91081OpenAlexW3122331528WikidataQ98119540 ScholiaQ98119540MaRDI QIDQ5239830
Daniele Nosenzo, Collin Raymond, Johannes Abeler
Publication date: 22 October 2019
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta14673
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