Conformity and truthful voting under different voting rules
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Publication:2325657
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Cites work
- An experimental study of truth-telling in a sender-receiver game
- Bandwagons and Momentum in Sequential Voting
- Conformity in voting
- Herding, social preferences and (non-)conformity
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- Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
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- Party Formation and Policy Outcomes under Different Electoral Systems
- Preferences for Truth‐Telling
- Strategic, sincere, and heuristic voting under four election rules: an experimental study
- The dark side of the vote: biased voters, social information, and information aggregation through majority voting
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Cited in
(7)- Voting and conformity: Russia, 1993--2016
- An experimental study of voting with costly delay
- Conformity in voting
- Unanimous rules in the laboratory
- The ``desire to conform and dynamic search by a committee
- The expressive power of voting rules
- What drives voter turnout? Experimental insights on collectivism and probability weighting
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