Strategic Voting over Strategic Proposals
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Recommendations
- Strategic voting and nomination
- On the Theory of Strategic Voting1
- Strategic voting in negotiating teams
- Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures
- Strategic voting when participation is costly
- Strategic voting under uncertainty about the voting method
- Strategic voting in repeated referenda
- A foundation for strategic agenda voting
- Strategic nomination and non-manipulable voting procedures
- Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures
Cited in
(22)- Strategic voting in repeated referenda
- The Pareto rule and strategic voting
- Voting for voters: the unanimity case
- Equity bargaining with common value
- Strategic consensus
- A theory of unanimous jury voting with an ambiguous likelihood
- Conformity and truthful voting under different voting rules
- Social pressure, transparency, and voting in committees
- First and second best voting rules in committees
- Pandering and electoral competition
- Jury voting without objective probability
- Wisdom of the crowd? Information aggregation in representative democracy
- Do Shareholders Vote Strategically? Voting Behavior, Proposal Screening, and Majority Rules*
- Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures
- Retrospective voting and party polarization
- Unanimous rules in the laboratory
- Strategic nomination and non-manipulable voting procedures
- DECIDING WHEN TO DECIDE: COLLECTIVE DELIBERATION AND OBSTRUCTION
- Strategic voting in the context of stable-matching of teams
- Conservativeness in jury decision-making
- On unanimity bargaining with commitment
- Majority voting leads to unanimity
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