On unanimity bargaining with commitment

DOI10.1007/S40505-026-00309-4MaRDI QIDQ7239318zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Ziqi Hang, Quan Wen

Publication date 8 May 2026

Published in Economic Theory Bulletin (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S40505-026-00309-4

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingcommitmentinefficient delayvoting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Cites work

• A Theory of Disagreement in Bargaining
• Bargaining and Reputation
• Bargaining with imperfect commitment
• Efficiency and surplus distribution in majoritarian reputational bargaining
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 49749 (Why is no real title available?)
• On the Role of Outside Options in Bargaining with Obstinate Parties
• Strategic Voting over Strategic Proposals
• Tough negotiations: bilateral bargaining with durable commitments
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining
• Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information

This page was built for publication: On unanimity bargaining with commitment

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q7239318)