Bargaining with imperfect commitment

DOI10.1006/GAME.1998.0700MaRDI QIDQ1304008zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Shinsuke Kambe

Publication date 5 December 1999

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://semanticscholar.org/paper/94f9cd3585c9f1197a879a347e20895757f9d8c2

zbMATH Keywords

stubbornnessunique equilibriumwar attrition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Commitment through incomplete information in a simple repeated bargaining game
• Bargaining without commitment
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• The optimal degree of commitment in a negotiation with a deadline
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Cites work

• A "Reputation" Refinement without Equilibrium
• A bargaining model based on the commitment tactic
• A Theory of Disagreement in Bargaining
• Commitment through incomplete information in a simple repeated bargaining game
• Deadline effects and inefficient delay in bargaining with endogenous commitment
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 54098 (Why is no real title available?)
• Perfect sequential equilibrium
• Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
• Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests
• Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
• Reputation and imperfect information
• Two-Person Cooperative Games

Cited in

(36)

• Bargaining and commitment in a permanent relationship
• The optimal degree of commitment in a negotiation with a deadline
• Hierarchical experimentation
• One-sided games in a war of attrition
• Building reputation in a war of attrition game: hawkish or dovish stance?
• No compromise: uncertain costs in reputational bargaining
• Commitment through incomplete information in a simple repeated bargaining game
• A bargaining model based on the commitment tactic
• Bargaining and waning commitments
• The absence of attrition in a war of attrition under complete information
• Personal power dynamics in bargaining
• Partial commitment in an endogenous timing duopoly
• Audience costs and reputation in crisis bargaining
• A reputation for honesty
• Pledge-and-review bargaining
• Resource inequality in the war of attrition
• Reputational bargaining with minimal knowledge of rationality
• Optimal value commitment in bilateral bargaining
• Optimal policy with credibility concerns
• Bargaining and reputation: an experiment on bargaining in the presence of behavioural types
• The role of commitment in bilateral trade
• Tough negotiations: bilateral bargaining with durable commitments
• A war of attrition with endogenous effort levels
• Bargaining under almost complete information
• Efficiency and surplus distribution in majoritarian reputational bargaining
• Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts
• Bargaining as a struggle between competing attempts at commitment
• Bargaining with revoking costs
• Two player bargaining model with outside subsidy
• Reputational bargaining with external resolution opportunities
• Reputation and the credibility of inflation plans
• The impact of perceived strength in the war of attrition
• Uncertain commitment power in a durable good monopoly
• On unanimity bargaining with commitment
• Bargaining, reference points, and limited influence
• Commitment in alternating offers bargaining

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