Bargaining with imperfect commitment
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 54098 (Why is no real title available?)
- A "Reputation" Refinement without Equilibrium
- A Theory of Disagreement in Bargaining
- A bargaining model based on the commitment tactic
- Commitment through incomplete information in a simple repeated bargaining game
- Deadline effects and inefficient delay in bargaining with endogenous commitment
- Perfect sequential equilibrium
- Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
- Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests
- Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
- Reputation and imperfect information
- Two-Person Cooperative Games
Cited in
(30)- Bargaining, reference points, and limited influence
- A war of attrition with endogenous effort levels
- Bargaining under almost complete information
- Optimal policy with credibility concerns
- The role of commitment in bilateral trade
- Bargaining and commitment in a permanent relationship
- Hierarchical experimentation
- Bargaining and reputation: an experiment on bargaining in the presence of behavioural types
- Commitment in alternating offers bargaining
- Bargaining with revoking costs
- No compromise: uncertain costs in reputational bargaining
- The absence of attrition in a war of attrition under complete information
- Efficiency and surplus distribution in majoritarian reputational bargaining
- Commitment through incomplete information in a simple repeated bargaining game
- The optimal degree of commitment in a negotiation with a deadline
- Building reputation in a war of attrition game: hawkish or dovish stance?
- One-sided games in a war of attrition
- Bargaining as a struggle between competing attempts at commitment
- Tough negotiations: bilateral bargaining with durable commitments
- Partial commitment in an endogenous timing duopoly
- Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts
- Pledge-and-review bargaining
- Resource inequality in the war of attrition
- Audience costs and reputation in crisis bargaining
- Optimal value commitment in bilateral bargaining
- Reputational bargaining with minimal knowledge of rationality
- A reputation for honesty
- Personal power dynamics in bargaining
- A bargaining model based on the commitment tactic
- Bargaining and waning commitments
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