The absence of attrition in a war of attrition under complete information
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Publication:2078041
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2021.11.004zbMATH Open1483.91008arXiv2110.12013OpenAlexW3215156175MaRDI QIDQ2078041FDOQ2078041
Authors: George Georgiadis, Young-Soo Kim, H. Dharma Kwon 
Publication date: 25 February 2022
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: We consider a two-player game of war of attrition under complete information. It is well-known that this class of games admits equilibria in pure, as well as mixed strategies, and much of the literature has focused on the latter. We show that if the players' payoffs whilst in "war" vary stochastically and their exit payoffs are heterogeneous, then the game admits Markov Perfect equilibria in pure strategies only. This is true irrespective of the degree of randomness and heterogeneity, thus highlighting the fragility of mixed-strategy equilibria to a natural perturbation of the canonical model. In contrast, when the players' flow payoffs are deterministic or their exit payoffs are homogeneous, the game admits equilibria in pure and mixed strategies.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2110.12013
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2-person games (91A05) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Equilibrium refinements (91A11)
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Cited In (13)
- Invader strategies in the war of attrition with private information
- Effects of a player's awareness of information acquisition and ability to change strategy in attrition games
- Equilibrium in a war of attrition with an option to fight decisively
- Fomenting conflict
- Asymmetric all‐pay auctions with spillovers
- The endgame
- One-sided games in a war of attrition
- Strategic investment with positive externalities
- Integer game with delay
- The War of Attrition in Continuous Time with Complete Information
- Asymptotics for the time of ruin in the war of attrition
- Markov perfect equilibria in an N-player war of attrition
- Title not available (Why is that?)
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