Invader strategies in the war of attrition with private information
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Publication:2441218
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.11.006zbMath1284.91188WikidataQ113870937 ScholiaQ113870937MaRDI QIDQ2441218
Publication date: 24 March 2014
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.11.006
evolutionary stability; war of attrition; continuous stability; evolutionary robustness; neighborhood invader strategy; strict equilibrium
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
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