Revisiting matrix games: The concept of neighborhood invader strategies

DOI10.1016/j.tpb.2005.11.006zbMath1109.92034WikidataQ51955485 ScholiaQ51955485MaRDI QIDQ2500392

Yanyan Li

Publication date: 23 August 2006

Published in: Theoretical Population Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tpb.2005.11.006

zbMATH Keywords

ESS; Replicator dynamics; NIS; Convergence stable; Matrix(G)-ESS

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

92D15: Problems related to evolution

91A40: Other game-theoretic models

92D25: Population dynamics (general)

91A22: Evolutionary games

Related Items

Evolutionary substitution and replacement in \(N\)-species Lotka-Volterra systems, Cooperation in defence against a predator, Evolutionary matrix games and optimization theory, Evolutionarily stable strategy and invader strategy in matrix games, The ESS for evolutionary matrix games under time constraints and its relationship with the asymptotically stable rest point of the replicator dynamics, Invader strategies in the war of attrition with private information, The replicator equation and other game dynamics, ESS, NIS and GIS for matrix games in n-species systems, ESS, NIS and GIS for multi-player matrix game in single population

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