Revisiting matrix games: The concept of neighborhood invader strategies

DOI10.1016/J.TPB.2005.11.006MaRDI QIDQ2500392zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Yanyan Li

Publication date 23 August 2006

Published in Theoretical Population Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tpb.2005.11.006

zbMATH Keywords

Convergence stableESSMatrix(G)-ESSNISReplicator dynamics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Problems related to evolution (92D15) Population dynamics (general) (92D25)

Recommendations

• Evolutionarily stable strategy and invader strategy in matrix games
• ESS, NIS and GIS in multi-player mixed games
• ESS, NIS and GIS for multi-player matrix game in single population
• Revisiting strategic models of evolution: The concept of neighborhood invader strategies
• A theory for the evolutionary game

Cites work

• A theory for the evolutionary game
• An ESS maximum principle for matrix games.
• Ecological Species Coevolution
• Evolutionary and dynamic stability in continuous population games
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• Evolutionary stability in one-parameter models under weak selection
• Evolutionary stability of plant communities and the maintenance of multiple dispersal types
• Evolutionary stability: One concept, several meanings
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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 53924 (Why is no real title available?)
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• INACCESSIBLE CONTINUOUSLY STABLE STRATEGIES
• Kin selection and strong evolutionary stability of mutual help
• Life histories with lottery competition in a stochastic environment: ESSs which do not prevail
• Measure dynamics on a one-dimensional continuous trait space: theoretical foundations for adaptive dynamics
• On the dynamic foundation of evolutionary stability in continuous models.
• Random evolutionarily stable strategies
• Revisiting strategic models of evolution: The concept of neighborhood invader strategies
• Stability of the replicator equation for a single species with a multi-dimensional continuous trait space
• Stability of the replicator equation with continuous strategy space
• The logic of animal conflict
• The structure and evolution of competition-organized ecological communities

Cited in

(14)

• Revisiting strategic models of evolution: The concept of neighborhood invader strategies
• Cooperation in defence against a predator
• Evolutionary matrix games and optimization theory
• Evolutionarily stable strategy and invader strategy in matrix games
• The ESS for evolutionary matrix games under time constraints and its relationship with the asymptotically stable rest point of the replicator dynamics
• Invader strategies in the war of attrition with private information
• The replicator equation and other game dynamics
• ESS, NIS and GIS in multi-player mixed games
• ESS, NIS and GIS for matrix games in n-species systems
• ESS, NIS and GIS for multi-player matrix game in single population
• Replicator dynamics generalized for evolutionary matrix games under time constraints
• Hyper diversity, species richness, and community structure in ESS and non-ESS communities
• Strong stability for matrix games under time constraints
• Evolutionary substitution and replacement in \(N\)-species Lotka-Volterra systems

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