Stability of the replicator equation with continuous strategy space
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Publication:2573262
DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2005.03.001zbMATH Open1115.91010OpenAlexW1966409365MaRDI QIDQ2573262FDOQ2573262
Authors: Ross Cressman 
Publication date: 7 November 2005
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2005.03.001
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Cited In (37)
- On the boundedness of solutions to replicator equations with respect to two measures
- Invader strategies in the war of attrition with private information
- Dynamics of strategy distributions in a one-dimensional continuous trait space for games with a quadratic payoff function
- Evolutionary game theory in mixed strategies: from microscopic interactions to kinetic equations
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Stability and optimal exploitation over an infinite time horizon of interacting populations
- Dynamical aspects of evolutionary stability
- When does the variance of replicator fitness decrease?
- Stability of solutions of kinetic equations corresponding to the replicator dynamics
- Stable and historic behavior in replicator equations generated by similar-order preserving mappings
- Evolution in games with a continuous action space
- Continuously stable strategies, neighborhood superiority and two-player games with continuous strategy space
- Dynamically stable sets in infinite strategy spaces
- The long-run behavior of the stochastic replicator dynamics
- Evolutionary stability in one-parameter models under weak selection
- Incomplete information, dynamic stability and the evolution of preferences: two examples
- Revisiting matrix games: The concept of neighborhood invader strategies
- An effective replicator equation for games with a continuous strategy set
- Imitative dynamics for games with continuous strategy space
- Evolutionary and dynamic stability in continuous population games
- Replicator dynamics for the game theoretic selection models based on state
- Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics: The continuous strategy case
- Similarity Suppresses Cyclicity: Why Similar Competitors Form Hierarchies
- Stochastic fictitious play with continuous action sets
- A vector Lyapunov approach to the stability problem for the n-population continuous time replicator dynamics
- A note on the replicator equation with explicit space and global regulation
- CSS, NIS and dynamic stability for two-species behavioral models with continuous trait spaces
- Neighborhood strong superiority and evolutionary stability of polymorphic profiles in asymmetric games
- Asymptotic stability of strongly uninvadable sets
- Stability of faces in asymmetric evolutionary games
- Measure dynamics on a one-dimensional continuous trait space: theoretical foundations for adaptive dynamics
- Stability of the replicator dynamics for games in metric spaces
- Evolutionary stability of polymorphic population states in continuous games
- Evolutionary stability in first price auctions
- Stability of the replicator equation for a single species with a multi-dimensional continuous trait space
- The logit dynamic for games with continuous strategy sets
- On superiority and weak stability of population states in evolutionary games
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