Stability of the replicator equation with continuous strategy space
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Publication:2573262
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2005.03.001zbMath1115.91010OpenAlexW1966409365MaRDI QIDQ2573262
Publication date: 7 November 2005
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2005.03.001
Noncooperative games (91A10) Dynamic games (91A25) Dynamical systems in optimization and economics (37N40) Evolutionary games (91A22)
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