Dynamics of strategy distributions in a one-dimensional continuous trait space for games with a quadratic payoff function

DOI10.3390/G11010014MaRDI QIDQ2221252zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors G. P. Karev

Publication date 26 January 2021

Published in Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3390/g11010014

zbMATH Keywords

continuous strategy spaceevolution of distributionHKV methodquadratic payoff function

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22)

Review text

Summary: Evolution of distribution of strategies in game theory is an interesting question that has been studied only for specific cases. Here I develop a general method to extend analysis of the evolution of continuous strategy distributions given a quadratic payoff function for any initial distribution in order to answer the following question -- given the initial distribution of strategies in a game, how will it evolve over time? I look at several specific examples, including normal distribution on the entire line, normal truncated distribution, as well as exponential and uniform distributions. I show that in the case of a negative quadratic term of the payoff function, regardless of the initial distribution, the current distribution of strategies becomes normal, full or truncated, and it tends to a distribution concentrated in a single point so that the limit state of the population is monomorphic. In the case of a positive quadratic term, the limit state of the population may be dimorphic. The developed method can now be applied to a broad class of questions pertaining to evolution of strategies in games with different payoff functions and different initial distributions.

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Cited in

(1)

• Co-evolution of payoff strategy and interaction strategy in prisoner's dilemma game

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