Evolutionary stability of polymorphic population states in continuous games

DOI10.1007/s13235-016-0207-1zbMath1390.91053arXiv1605.07544OpenAlexW2406023882MaRDI QIDQ2636487

K. S. Mallikarjuna Rao, A. J. Shaiju, Dharini Hingu

Publication date: 5 June 2018

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1605.07544

zbMATH Keywords

stabilityreplicator dynamicsESSevolutionary gamescontinuous action spaces

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items

Neighborhood strong superiority and evolutionary stability of polymorphic profiles in asymmetric games ⋮ Asymptotic stability of strongly uninvadable sets ⋮ On superiority and weak stability of population states in evolutionary games ⋮ Globally Strong Uninvadable Sets of Profiles in Asymmetric Games ⋮ Dynamics of strategy distributions in a one-dimensional continuous trait space for games with a quadratic payoff function ⋮ Evolutionary stability of polymorphic profiles in asymmetric games

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