Asymptotic stability of strongly uninvadable sets
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Publication:2177799
DOI10.1007/S10479-017-2695-9zbMATH Open1437.91074OpenAlexW2766937455MaRDI QIDQ2177799FDOQ2177799
Authors: Dharini Hingu
Publication date: 6 May 2020
Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-017-2695-9
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2-person games (91A05) Evolutionary games (91A22) Asymptotic stability in control theory (93D20) Spaces of games (91A70)
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- The logit dynamic for games with continuous strategy sets
- Stability of the replicator equation with continuous strategy space
- Pairwise comparison dynamics for games with continuous strategy space
- On evolutionarily stable sets
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- Evolutionary dynamics over continuous action spaces for population games that arise from symmetric two-player games
- Game theoretical foundations of evolutionary stability
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- Dynamically stable sets in infinite strategy spaces
- Evolutionarily stable sets in mixed-strategist models
- Evolutionary stability of polymorphic population states in continuous games
Cited In (4)
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