Evolutionary dynamics over continuous action spaces for population games that arise from symmetric two-player games
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Publication:1945842
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2012.07.004zbMath1275.91020OpenAlexW2026938269MaRDI QIDQ1945842
Publication date: 17 April 2013
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.07.004
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