Pairwise comparison dynamics for games with continuous strategy space

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2014.07.001zbMath1309.91021OpenAlexW2092631816MaRDI QIDQ406407

Man-Wah Cheung

Publication date: 8 September 2014

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.07.001

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary dynamicscontinuous strategy spacepopulation games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22)

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