Generalized perturbed best response dynamics with a continuum of strategies

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2021.105398zbMath1484.91050OpenAlexW3174767784MaRDI QIDQ2123178

Yanyan Li

Publication date: 8 April 2022

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://dp.ashoka.edu.in/ash/wpaper/paper51.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

potential gameslogit dynamicnegative semidefinite gamesperturbed best response

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Potential and congestion games (91A14)

Related Items (1)

The logit dynamic in supermodular games with a continuum of strategies: a deterministic approximation approach

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