Social Stability and Equilibrium
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Publication:3352877
DOI10.2307/2938230zbMath0728.90099OpenAlexW2102704407MaRDI QIDQ3352877
Publication date: 1991
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4534.pdf
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