Adaptive dynamics and the implementation problem with complete information
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Publication:1300208
DOI10.1006/jeth.1999.2530zbMath0940.91044OpenAlexW3121280891MaRDI QIDQ1300208
Publication date: 10 May 2000
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2530
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